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Abstract
Background: EU Decision 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border health threats provides a legal basis for
collaboration between EU Member States, and between international and European level institutions on
preparedness, prevention, and mitigation in the event of a public health emergency. The Decision provides a
context for the present study, which aims to identify good practices and lessons learned in preparedness and
response to Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) (in UK, Greece, and Spain) and poliomyelitis (in Poland and
Cyprus).
Methods: Based on a documentary review, followed by five week-long country visits involving a total of 61
interviews and group discussions with experts from both the health and non-health sectors, this qualitative case
study has investigated six issues related to preparedness and response to MERS and poliomyelitis: national plans
and overall preparedness capacity; training and exercises; risk communication; linking policy and implementation;
interoperability between the health and non-health sectors; and cross-border collaboration.
Results: Preparedness and response plans for MERS and poliomyelitis were in place in the participating countries,
with a high level of technical expertise available to implement them. Nevertheless, formal evaluation of the
responses to previous public health emergencies have sometimes been limited, so lessons learned may not be
reflected in updated plans, thereby risking mistakes being repeated in future. The nature and extent of inter-
sectoral collaboration varied according to the sectors involved, with those sectors that have traditionally had good
collaboration (e.g. animal health and food safety), as well as those that have a financial incentive for controlling
infectious diseases (e.g. agriculture, tourism, and air travel) seen as most likely to have integrated public health
preparedness and response plans. Although the formal protocols for inter-sectoral collaboration were not always up
to date, good personal relations were reported within the relevant professional networks, which could be brought
into play in the event of a public health emergency. Cross-border collaboration was greatly facilitated if the
neighbouring country was a fellow EU Member State.
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Conclusions: Infectious disease outbreaks remain as an ongoing threat. Efforts are required to ensure that core
public health capacities for the full range of preparedness and response activities are sustained.
Keywords: Public health, Preparedness and response, MERS-coronavirus, Poliomyelitis, Cross-border, Inter-sectoral,
Risk communication, Interoperability, European Union
Background
EU Decision 1082/2013/EU (October 2013) on serious
cross-border health threats provides a legal basis for collab-
oration and information exchange between EU member
states, and between international and European level insti-
tutions on preparedness, prevention, and mitigation in the
event of a public health emergency [1]. This work entails a
wide range of activities, including ensuring laboratory cap-
acity for disease diagnosis; requiring hospitals to have plans
in place to safely and effectively treat patients as well as to
minimize the risk of nosocomial transmission; developing
and maintaining strong surveillance systems to identify new
cases; ensuring strong inter-sectoral collaboration, in par-
ticular between the relevant health and non-health sectors;
and developing capacity for the provision of effective risk
communication to the public and to health professionals
[2] [3] [4] [5] [6].
Among the health threats that are considered import-
ant within the context of EU Decision 1082 – insofar as
an outbreak in one EU country potentially represents a
threat to all the others – are poliomyelitis and respira-
tory diseases such as Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
(MERS) [7]. The importation and spread of MERS or a
reintroduction of poliomyelitis into the EU could have
significant social, economic and political ramifications.
In this sense, the legal framework provided by EU Deci-
sion 1082 offers an effective basis for discussions about
European preparedness and response.
MERS and poliomyelitis are very different diseases,
both clinically and epidemiologically. MERS is a respira-
tory infection, first identified in 2012 [8] and now seen
as one of the top emerging pathogens with potential for
causing a severe outbreak [9]. It appears that the ultim-
ate source of most MERS outbreaks is camels who infect
humans, with most human cases – whether autochthon-
ous or imported – caused by secondary or tertiary noso-
comial transmission within the healthcare sector [10] via
an infected person’s respiratory secretions [11]. As of
April 4, 2017 there had been 1936 cases reported by
health authorities worldwide, of whom 690 (36%) had
died [12]; while within the EU there have been 15 cases,
with 7 (47%) deaths [13] [14]. MERS has not been de-
clared by WHO to be a Public Health Emergency of
International Concern (PHEIC), but the Committee re-
sponsible for this decision has nonetheless stated that
“the progress [made to date against MERS] is not yet
sufficient to control this threat and until this is achieved,
individual countries and the global community will re-
main at significant risk for further outbreaks” [15].
Where human-to-human infection does occur (usually to
members of the same household of the index case, other
patients, or health care workers [16]), the mean number of
secondary cases generated by a typical infectious individual,
called R0, has been calculated as generally being < 1 [17]. In
other words, the outbreak would die out by itself. However,
a MERS outbreak in South Korea in 2015 – introduced by
a single imported case from Saudi Arabia – illustrated the
dramatic effect the disease can have on the local or national
healthcare systems. This outbreak, involving 185 cases, was
driven primarily by delayed diagnosis of a few index pa-
tients, with the result that the reproductive number (R0)
greatly exceeded 1 in the early stages of the outbreak [18]
[17]. It is not known whether these individuals became
super-spreaders for clinical, virological, environmental, or
social reasons, and it is precisely this uncertainty which
highlights the importance of good preparedness against a
potential upsurge in MERS cases in Europe.
By contrast to MERS, poliomyelitis is a vaccine prevent-
able disease, spread predominantly by the faecal–oral
route. Significant resources have been dedicated to bring
about the global eradication of polio, but on 28 May 2014,
WHO declared the ongoing international spread of polio-
myelitis to be a Public Health Emergency of International
Concern (PHEIC) [19]. The WHO European Region has
been officially polio-free since 2002 [20], but this status
has been challenged several times in recent years by
events in nearby countries. In 2013–2014, wild poliovirus
was detected in sewage samples in Israel, and cases of
paralytic poliomyelitis were confirmed in Syria at a time
when several EU countries were receiving refugees from
Syria fleeing the political unrest [21]. In addition, two
cases of circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV)
were confirmed in Ukraine in July 2015 [22].
Continued vigilance against the two diseases in Europe
is, therefore, essential. Given this, the European Centre
for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) has initiated
a series of case studies to review the public health pre-
paredness status of the health and other relevant sectors
in three EU Member States with respect to MERS (the
UK, Greece, and Spain, which to date have had 4, 1, and
0 cases respectively) and two EU Member States with re-
spect to poliomyelitis (Poland and Cyprus). Poland
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borders the region of Ukraine where the outbreak of
cVDPV was identified in 2015; while the migrant crisis
may place Cyprus at risk of poliomyelitis importation.
The European Regional Certification Commission for
Poliomyelitis Eradication’s (RCC) 2015 report concluded
that both Poland and Cyprus were considered to be at
‘intermediate risk’ of subsequent transmission of polio-
virus in the event of an imported case [23].
In addition to its being a serious emerging infectious
disease in its own right, MERS was taken as a case study
that could provide insights into preparedness planning
for respiratory diseases including influenza and pan-
demic influenza, as well as into the links between human
and animal health. Poliomyelitis was included as a case
to review preparedness planning for vaccine preventable
diseases targeted for elimination by WHO with the po-
tential for serious outbreak impact, along with related
environmental and containment issues. The selection of
countries was based on (a) actual cases or the potential
for cases to emerge due to proximity of the health
threat, and (b) an expression of interest to participate
from the country.
This is the background for the present paper, which
aims to identify good practices, lessons learned, and gaps
in preparedness and response to MERS and to poliomy-
elitis respectively in the five countries. This aim is in line
with EU Decision 1082/2013/EU [1], which provides the
legal framework for addressing cross border health
threats, including analysis of preparedness planning,
interoperability between health and non-health sectors,
business continuity, and cross border collaboration. The
study also aimed to provide insights into the ways in
which the capacities and capabilities for these domains
(concerning, for example, training, simulation exercises,
risk communication, and challenges in the implementa-
tion process) have been considered by the key stake-
holders. Based on our findings, we propose approaches
for strengthening public health emergency preparedness
plans for the five participating countries and for other
EU Member States.
Methods
This study used a qualitative case study methodology
[24], which included (i) a documentary review, based on
published and unpublished materials; and (ii) a series of
face-to-face, open-ended, semi-structured interviews and
focus groups with experts from both the health and
non-health sectors who either played some role in
responding to the MERS case/s in their country, or who
are engaged in preparedness and response activities
against polio.
In order to minimise bias in the documentary database,
the material collected came from two independent sources:
internet databases, which were searched by our research
team, and which produced predominantly English-language
material; and documents provided to us by each country’s
ECDC National Focal Point (NFP) for Preparedness and
Response,1 who was our key country contact.
The internet searches involved databases such as Google
Scholar and PubMed, using search terms including the
name of the country, ‘preparedness plan’, ‘MERS’, ‘influenza’,
‘polio’, ‘standard operative procedure’, etc. Material pro-
vided by the ECDC NFPs included (i) Policies that may be
related to the EU Decision on serious cross-border public
threats; (ii) Relevant reports and findings from previous
EU-supported studies; (iii) Standard Operating Proce-
dures, contingency plans and guidelines in the event of a
pandemic respiratory disease threat; (iv) Lessons learned
from any simulation or training exercises that may have
been conducted. Some of this was available only in the
local language, so it was translated into English using on-
line software, thus enabling us to develop a good sense of
the key points made.
Analysis of the documents was conducted on a the-
matic basis (i.e. including preparedness plans,
inter-sectoral collaboration, risk communication etc.),
with the major points on each theme extracted and
reviewed carefully by the research team prior to the field
visit. This process served to provide an understanding of
the specific country context, as well as to inform the
questions that we asked during the interviews.
For the interviews and focus groups, the ECDC NFP
and his/her institution also took responsibility for organ-
izing an intensive week of meetings with representatives
from key agencies and sectors. The criteria for selection
reflected the specifics of the respective case studies: for
MERS, as a respiratory infection, experts were inter-
viewed from the national public health authorities, the
Ministry of Health, ambulance services, laboratory spe-
cialists, infectious disease doctors; and from non-human
health sectors such as travel, transport, health journal-
ism, and animal health. For polio, the National Certifica-
tion Committee for Polio was also represented, along
with non-health sectors such as border control, the In-
terior Ministry, and non-governmental organizations
such as the Red Cross. Once a provisional list of relevant
experts had been agreed, contact was made with them
by the country counterparts to arrange for an interview.
The interviews and focus groups for MERS were con-
ducted in the UK (England), Greece, and Spain during
September–October 2014; while those for poliomyelitis
were conducted in Poland and Cyprus during November
2015. A total of 35 and 26 interview sessions were held for
MERS and poliomyelitis respectively; of these, 36 were
with people from the health sector and 25 were with
people from non-health sectors. See Table 1 for a sum-
mary, and Additional file 1 for details of the interviewees’
affiliations.
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Individual interviews were conducted whenever pos-
sible, but in some cases, focus groups of different sizes
were organised in order to involve more participants in
the discussion, thereby enabling us to record opinions
from different stakeholders at the same time, and to hear
a wider range of perspectives. The interview sessions in
Greece, England and Spain included from one to three
respondents each; the numbers were similar for most
sessions in Cyprus and Poland, but some of the sessions
involved group discussions with up to 8 and 20 respon-
dents respectively. We had requested for the focus
groups to include no more than 10 people, but local or-
ganisers and the willingness of experts to participate
sometimes added to that number. Similar questions were
asked in the individual interview as in the group inter-
views. Material from the interviews and the focus groups
was combined for the analysis.
For the interviews and focus groups, we developed
pools of questions for both MERS and polio, in cooper-
ation with the ECDC NFPs, which aimed at reflecting
the objectives of the study concerning planning and pre-
paredness policies and practices, risk communication,
training and exercises, vaccination (for polio), surveil-
lance, and issues to do with inter-sectoral and
cross-border coordination. One over-riding sub-set of
the questions was asked to all interviewees, regardless of
their particular position; another sub-set of questions
concerned issues specific to the interviewee’s particular
sector or position; and a final sub-set of questions was
used only if time permitted. Interviewees were also free
to discuss other, additional issues that they considered to
be important, but which were not included in our
pre-determined list. Through this process, we received
responses to each question from a range of different
people in different positions, thereby facilitating triangu-
lation of the data in each country. We do not claim to
have achieved data saturation in all the issues covered,
but, because of the range and expertise of the people we
interviewed in each country, we are confident that all
the major relevant points were raised.
Oral and, where feasible, written informed consent was
sought and obtained from participants after explaining the
objectives of the study. Interviews were conducted
face-to-face, either at the interviewees’ office or at the
ECDC NFP’s home institution; and interviewees took part
purely in their professional capacity.
Most of the interview sessions lasted around 60 min.
All except for four of the interviews in the UK, Greece,
Poland and Cyprus were conducted in English; profes-
sional interpreters assisted in these cases. The interviews
in Spain were conducted in Spanish by native speakers.
All five country visits were focused primarily on the na-
tional level, but in Poland, a 24-h visit was made to Rze-
szów in the south east of the country, 300 km from
Warsaw and near to the Ukraine border; and in Cyprus,
the team spent half a day at an asylum and refugee
centre at Kofinou, 50 km from Nicosia.
The interviews were conducted by researchers based
at Umeå University, Sweden, which was contracted by
ECDC to do this work. A senior researcher conducted
the interviews in each country, supported by a junior re-
searcher who took notes. Most of the MERS interviews
were digitally recorded as an additional back-up, but,
based on our experience from the MERS phase of this
work, we considered it unnecessary to record the polio-
myelitis interviews, so we relied exclusively on the notes
instead.
The interviewers were accompanied to many of the in-
terviews by the ECDC NFP or his/her representative,
which greatly facilitated the introductions and the pres-
entation of the study objectives. The interviewees had
received the questions in advance of our visit, so they
were able to review the topics and prepare their re-
sponses as they saw fit.
After each interview, the investigators exchanged views
on what had been discussed, and agreed on some of the
key points raised. Notes were finalized at the end of each
working day, and collectively these constituted the data-
set used in the production of five country-specific
reports.
A debriefing meeting was held after the last interview
on the last day of each country visit, including the two in-
terviewers, the ECDC NFP, and representatives from the
national public health authorities, the Ministries of Health,
Internal Affairs and other invited representatives, and col-
leagues from ECDC in Stockholm (via teleconference
Table 1 Number of interview sessions for the two investigated diseases, conducted by sector, in each of the five participating
countries
Disease Health Sector interview sessions Non-Health Sector interview sessions Total number of interview sessions
UK (England) MERS 5 6 11
Greece MERS 6 6 12
Spain MERS 7 5 12
Poland Polio 9 4 13
Cyprus Polio 9 4 13
TOTAL 36 25 61
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link). This discussion constituted the first formal review of
the week’s work, and as such proved to be a valuable mo-
ment for reflection and validation of the initial analysis.
When the field work week was over, the data were
subjected to thematic analysis, based on a number of
pre-determined themes (e.g. preparedness planning, risk
communication, training etc., as delineated above), but a
few other themes also emerged inductively from the data
during analysis. These analyses provided the basis for
country-specific reports, each of which were then sent
to the respective ECDC NFP for review and an oppor-
tunity to correct, clarify and otherwise comment on the
conclusions drawn. In turn, the five (unpublished) coun-
try reports formed the basis for the present article.
Results
The findings from the country visits are presented col-
lectively below, in six broad themes, and with commen-
tary on both MERS and polio. Where possible, countries
are anonymized in this discussion. Similarly, we have not
used quotations in the text, as agreed with the National
Focal Points in the participating countries, in order to
preserve confidentiality.
National plans and overall preparedness and capacity
The overall perception of our interviewees in all five par-
ticipating countries was that the level of preparedness
for MERS and poliomyelitis respectively was high. Clear
legal frameworks exist which indicate specific roles and
responsibilities, and the key actors in each country ap-
peared to be well informed about these. Networks with
appropriate resources and diagnostic capacity for the
two diseases also exist in all the countries. However, al-
though these are well-integrated and properly function-
ing formal systems, informal personal networks and
contacts both within the health sector and between the
health and relevant non-health sectors were widely con-
sidered as being key to the effectiveness of process and
practice in preparedness and response.
In countries where MERS preparedness was analysed,
pandemic influenza preparedness plans exist in each of
the UK, Greece, and Spain, and, as a respiratory infec-
tion, these were seen as being of at least some relevance
to MERS (see https://ecdc.europa.eu/en/seasonal-in-
fluenza/preparedness/influenza-pandemic-prepared-
ness-plans). However, while these plans are in the public
domain and are therefore easily accessible, they have not
been updated for several years, which points to potential
gaps in preparedness. Operationally, we were informed
that much knowledge and experience has been gained
through various global public health events since the be-
ginning of the century, such as Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome (SARS, 2003), the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09
pandemic (2009), and Ebola (2014–2016); and many of
the practices and lessons learned from these threats have
been sufficiently generic to prepare frontline health
workers and the relevant authorities for MERS. One of
the major lessons learned from these events has been
the necessity to develop systems for increasing health
care capacity in the event of a pandemic or a major out-
break. We were informed that these systems include
plans to utilise the private sector if the public sector is
overwhelmed by, for example, MERS cases; and also the
reorganisation of hospital ward structures such that an
entire ward could be given over to patients with MERS,
thereby minimising the danger of cross-infection be-
tween patients in different wards.
In relation to polio, all EU countries are obliged by the
WHO’s Regional Certification Commission for Poliomy-
elitis Eradication (RCC) to ensure that they have polio-
myelitis preparedness plans in place, including access to
vaccine in case of an outbreak or plans on how to get
some; and, through their obligatory annual reports to
the RCC, Cyprus and Poland have both shown that they
comply with this [23]. Overall poliomyelitis vaccination
rates are high in both Cyprus and Poland (97 and 92%,
respectively for the three doses, according to 2015 data
[25]), but both countries nonetheless have relatively
small but still significant numbers of refugees and popu-
lations that are hard to reach in vaccination campaigns
(e.g. Roma people) and which are therefore vulnerable in
case of a poliomyelitis virus outbreak. Under such cir-
cumstances it is important to have well-functioning sur-
veillance systems in place in order to identify potential
poliomyelitis cases. Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) sur-
veillance is regarded as the gold standard for detecting
cases of poliomyelitis [26]; it involves finding and report-
ing children with AFP; transporting stool samples for
analysis; isolating and identifying poliovirus in the la-
boratory; and mapping the virus to determine the origin
of the virus strain. According to WHO guidelines, envir-
onmental surveillance can be justified in some specific
situations in addition to AFP surveillance [27]. Environ-
mental surveillance involves testing sewage or other en-
vironmental samples for the presence of poliovirus [28].
Both countries have AFP surveillance systems in place.
At the time of the study, environmental surveillance sys-
tems have not been introduced, however, but the requis-
ite technical and scientific capacity does exist, should a
decision be taken in the future to bring them in.
The financial crisis and subsequent austerity measures
that have affected many European countries since 2009
have had a significant adverse effect on preparedness
and response capacity in some countries. We were in-
formed of budget cuts that have adversely affected re-
cruitment of new staff as well as opportunities for
trainings and other exercises. However, we were in-
formed that emergency funding is, or would be provided
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in the event of a public health emergency, either directly
from governmental structures tasked with dealing with
crises (i.e. civil protection or Prime Minister’s crisis cen-
tres), or, if such arrangements exist within the legal
framework of a particular country, from the Ministry of
Health.
Training and exercises
Training and exercises (including simulation exercises
(SIMEX)) are recognised as key components of any ef-
forts to sustain public health preparedness capacity, both
through their ability to identify weaknesses in the sys-
tems and because they provide a basis for developing
networks of professionals that could be called upon dur-
ing a public health emergency [29]. Training and exer-
cises can be conducted within a single country, ideally
including both the health and all the relevant
non-health-related sectors; or as part of a multi-country
process involving neighbouring countries, including
other EU Member States and/or non-EU neighbouring
countries. Exercises could also provide an external im-
petus that demands a review of national plans, which
may otherwise be seen as a low priority activity. Further,
they provide an opportunity to retain staff capacities and
institutional memories, including whatever lessons may
have been learned from recent public health emergen-
cies, as well as preparedness legacies from, for example,
the Olympic Games (held in Greece in 2004, and the
UK in 2012).
However, in at least one of the three countries we vis-
ited in relation to MERS, cuts in funding had been made
for general preparedness and training activities, and na-
tional exercises had been cancelled. This significantly re-
duced the opportunities to enhance preparedness and
response measures in the event of a serious public health
threat to the country. In another country, the national
preparedness plan called for exercises to ensure that
business continuity arrangements are in place for the
emergency services; and training for personnel whose
work will oblige them to wear respirators. However, no
details were given regarding how often or how extensive
these trainings should be. It was suggested by our inter-
viewees that executing table-top preparedness exercises
may prove to be a less expensive, and therefore more
feasible alternative than conducting full-scale simulation
exercises. Where possible, these could be organised by
national authorities, complemented as appropriate with
input from international organisations.
The absence of poliomyelitis in Poland and Cyprus
since 1984 and 1995, respectively [30] [31] has dimin-
ished practical, hands-on experience of dealing with the
disease. It has also diminished the perceived imperative
for poliomyelitis preparedness, and as such, there have
been no poliomyelitis preparedness exercises conducted
in either country in recent years. Since a rapid and ef-
fective initial response is essential for controlling a polio-
myelitis outbreak [32], this could lead to delays and a
compromised response if one was to occur. That said,
some interviewees did recommend that support could
be provided from, for example, ECDC for a simulation
exercise or training, either at national or regional level
and involving all the relevant sectors, with a particular
focus on risk assessment and incident analysis, alongside
a review and discussion of existing outbreak response
guidelines for polio.
Risk communication
In each of the three countries we visited for MERS,
media and communications experts in the respective
national-level public health institutions are mandated to
lead risk communication efforts for the public and for
health workers during a respiratory disease epidemic or
pandemic. These included the Hellenic Centre for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention in Greece, known by its
Greek acronym as KEELPNO; Public Health England
(PHE) in the UK; and the Coordination System for
Health Alerts and Emergencies (SICAS) in Spain. One of
these institutions had produced health-promoting mate-
rials that were relevant for a pandemic situation, and
stored them on hidden webpages that could instantly be
made public should the need arise. This is a useful
model that could be applied elsewhere. Since a report-
edly significant potential challenge during a pandemic
concerned communicating with migrant, hard-to-reach,
and non-native-speaking populations, it was pointed out
that all relevant health-promoting materials should be
translated into languages used by such people. Without
this, they may not know how to take the necessary steps
to protect themselves.
For polio, we were told that one of the most important
challenges facing risk communicators who work with vac-
cine preventable diseases (VPDs), and specifically those
who work with polio, is the fact that the public does not
feel especially at risk from these diseases. With Cyprus and
Poland having been polio-free for over 20 and 30 years, re-
spectively, memories of the disease have largely faded and a
majority of people are simply unaware of its potential sever-
ity. Thus there is reduced public acceptance of vaccination
alongside an impression that the benefits of some vaccines
may, within the current epidemiological context, only mar-
ginally outweigh their potential risks [33]. This, in combin-
ation with the fact that there could be issues with trust in
some public authorities in some of the countries visited
means that providing vaccine-promoting information that
is trusted, believed, and acted upon requires a carefully de-
veloped strategy. Solutions suggested to us included (i) the
public health authorities making systematic efforts to
understand vaccine hesitancy where it exists, and
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responding proactively to people’s concerns using appropri-
ate information that is already available from, for example,
ECDC, WHO-Euro, and the Global Poliomyelitis Eradica-
tion Initiative; (ii) conducting trainings about vaccination
for journalists, who might need to be better informed about
the topic so that they do not inadvertently perpetuate
myths and misperceptions about vaccination; and (iii) en-
hanced use of social media by the public health authorities.
An important finding from several of the countries we
visited was that evaluation of the risk communication
strategies operated by the public health authorities is
often limited or non-existent. Thus the effectiveness of
the strategies is unknown, as is the extent to which the
messages could be misunderstood or misinterpreted.
From national policy to local level implementation
The relationship between the national and local levels is
critical for ensuring continuity between policy and im-
plementation, but in each of the three countries that we
visited for MERS, challenges of different sorts were iden-
tified regarding the implementation of national policy at
local level. These challenges arose either as a result of
reportedly insufficient financial or human resources at
local level, or because of particular structures or policy
divisions between national, regional and local level. For
example, while the decentralisation in one of the three
countries was seen as a strength – as the local structures
themselves developed the operational plans and as such
these were ‘owned’ by the people who would implement
them – we were also told that local authorities in that
same country had differing financial capacity to imple-
ment activities above the nationally required minimum
level, which could result in sub-optimal coordination of
the national pandemic response, with different kinds and
quality of activities in different regions.
Countries may also experience significant shortages of
qualified personnel in some peripheral areas, with the
result that the preparedness and response infrastructure
in those places could potentially be sub-optimal. How-
ever, it was suggested that at the local level there may be
areas with better inter-sectoral collaboration and coord-
ination than many major urban centres, simply because
people in the different sectors often know each other
personally. In that sense, the limitations in one issue
may be offset to some extent by the advantages in
another.
In the case of poliomyelitis preparedness, both the
countries that we visited appeared to have structures in
place to ensure a coordinated and effective flow between
national policy and local level implementation. As with
many small countries, the Cypriot system includes some
minor local level administrative functions, but since the
country is so small, a large proportion of the national
level administrative, legislative and organizational work
is effectively also local. Operationally, this results in a
system that does not give much room for decision mak-
ing power at the local level, but it also means that pol-
icies and directives tend to be easily followed and
implemented.
Poland, as a much larger country, operates on a largely
decentralized basis. District level authorities have au-
thority to enforce public health regulations, including
quarantine if necessary; but the Ministry of Health in
Warsaw provides guidelines for the lower administrative
levels in order to ensure uniformity in planning and im-
plementation. We were not informed of any significant
weaknesses in this system.
Interoperability between the health and non-health
sectors
One of the most important non-health-related sectors of
relevance for MERS is, we were told, air travel. If MERS
spread widely in a country, then Civil Protection agen-
cies would be engaged, as would Border Control. In
addition, working with journalists would be key to en-
suring an effective response (as suggested under Risk
Communication above). Collectively, these sectors repre-
sent a wide array of different actors, and ensuring inter-
operability between them and the health sector could
represent a challenge. For example, interoperability with
Border Control was reportedly poor in one of the coun-
tries we visited, with personnel said to be ill-trained re-
garding what to do if presented with someone
presenting with respiratory distress.
By contrast, those sectors that have a clear financial
incentive for controlling infectious diseases – including
agriculture/animal health, tourism, and air travel – were
seen as more likely to have in place public health pre-
paredness and response plans that were interoperable
with those of the health sector. Within the agricultural
sector, for example, while there are very few camels in
Europe, recent evidence points to the possibility that
pigs are susceptible to the MERS virus [34]. The histor-
ically strong collaboration between the animal and hu-
man health sectors that exists in many countries
provides a good basis for addressing the potential risks
arising from this finding. Such collaboration can be seen
within the context of the ‘One Health’ approach, which
“recognizes that the health of humans, animals and eco-
systems are interconnected, [and which] involves apply-
ing a coordinated, collaborative, multidisciplinary and
cross-sectoral approach to address potential or existing
risks that originate at the animal-human-ecosystems
interface” [35].
Safety is of course also a primary concern for airlines,
as their very survival depends on ensuring safe travel.
Consequently, systematic thinking about safety has been
fully integrated into all aspects of this sector. At one
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airport we visited, we were told of a generic pandemic
preparedness plan, which includes updated lists of key
contacts for all the key institutions involved (including
the national public health agency, the ambulance service,
and major hospitals), and which lists clear standard op-
erating procedures for different eventualities. If an air-
craft arrived with a passenger on board who appeared to
be carrying a serious infectious disease, for example, air
traffic controllers would be obliged to obtain as much
information as possible from the pilot in advance of
their arrival, and this would be forwarded to the airport
authorities who would then contact the national public
health agency. Once landed, the aircraft must follow
clear rules about where it is to be parked, and how the
disembarking passengers are to be processed.
With regard to polio, we were told that the relevant
sectors in both countries included Border Control and
the Interior Ministry for the border regions, and, more
widely, those responsible for managing migration and
refugees. The formal procedures for inter-sectoral col-
laboration are reportedly not always as clearly delineated
as they are for the sector-specific work, in part due to
what was described as the ‘vertical modes of communi-
cation’ in the respective sectors. Overall, the success of
inter-sectoral collaboration in poliomyelitis preparedness
and response relies more on personal contacts between
the key actors than on formal protocols, at least in part
because there have been no cases for many years, and
therefore familiarity with these protocols is limited. A
local level example in one country was described to us
as having very well organized inter-sectoral collaboration
on poliomyelitis preparedness, involving the health au-
thorities, the border guards, and the Ministry of the In-
terior, but this was because the key actors in this region
know each another personally, and they meet through
their work on a regular basis. However, effective and
sustainable inter-sectoral collaboration on this basis is
vulnerable to individual personnel moving from one offi-
cial position to another, or otherwise being unavailable
in a crisis situation.
Cross-border collaboration
We found few significant disease-specific issues in rela-
tion to cross-border collaboration. Rather, the nature
and extent of cross-border collaboration in addressing
health threats appears to be determined primarily by the
larger political context, as well as by the formal and in-
formal relationships that may have developed between
individuals and institutions on both sides of the border
or borders in question.
For example, our findings suggest that a key determin-
ing factor relating to cross-border collaboration is
whether or not the neighbour in question is a fellow
member of the EU. As a general rule, collaboration and
information exchange is greatly facilitated if it takes
place between two EU Member States as opposed to be-
tween an EU Member State and a non-EU Member
State. For example, the Early Warning and Response
System (EWRS) was cited by interviewees in several
countries as an invaluable instrument for keeping
abreast of infectious disease developments in fellow-EU
countries. Operated by ECDC, EWRS is an
internet-based system for sharing information about
health alerts between EU Member States. It includes an
option for sending a copy of any message to WHO if the
information might be of wider concern, for example in
the context of the International Health Regulations.
EWRS does not operate outside the EU.
In one country that we visited with a non-EU Member
State neighbour, two distinct perspectives of
cross-border relations emerged in the interviews: the na-
tional level perspective, and the local level perspective.
At national level, the flow of health information between
the two capital cities was reportedly very limited, in spite
of friendly relations between the countries, with most in-
formation about the other country reaching our hosts
via WHO and ECDC. This was due to quite different or-
ganisational cultures between the two countries, which
complicated communications. Consequently, the Inter-
national Health Regulations provided the only real
means for our hosts to learn about events in the other
country.
At local level, by contrast, there was a very good ex-
change of information between the respective border
control authorities, based on a longstanding bilateral
legal agreement. Each border post between the two
countries had personnel whose jobs specifically included
communicating with their counterparts across the
border. Further, border guard commanders in both
countries were obliged to immediately notify their coun-
terparts across the border in the event of any sudden
and unexpected illness or disease that was identified in
the area under their jurisdiction. However, much of this
information stayed and was acted upon at the local level,
and – because it was operational as opposed to strategic
– it was not sent to national level.
In spite of the stated advantages of working with fellow
EU Member States, one challenge was mentioned that
arises from the EU’s Schengen Agreement. At least up until
the current refugee crisis, there has been free movement
between all signatory countries, with no form of border
control. This means that once people have entered into the
Schengen Area – even if they have originated from a
high-risk country for a particular infectious disease – there
is no realistic way of systematically following up on their
health status or ensuring that they receive health care as ne-
cessary. As MERS cases at early stages and poliomyelitis in-
fections are usually asymptomatic, enhanced epidemiological
Kinsman et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2018) 18:528 Page 8 of 13
surveillance and early detection therefore remain the best
preventive measures. For poliomyelitis, WHO recommenda-
tions for travellers to and from countries where the virus is
circulating to be vaccinated should be followed [36].
Participation in European and other international dis-
ease surveillance networks and associated research pro-
jects was recognised as playing an important role in
maintaining high levels of cross-border preparedness.
Similarly, simulation exercises involving several coun-
tries were described to us as being invaluable opportun-
ities for identifying weaknesses in preparedness systems,
and for creating the basis for strong, cross-border pro-
fessional networks that could prove critical in tackling
cross-border health threats. The EpiSouth project was
cited as an example of this [37], which included both EU
and non-EU Member States from the entire Mediterra-
nean region. Such exercises are expensive, however, and
EU support for more such multi-country simulation ex-
ercises, possibly also including non-EU countries, was
suggested as a potentially good investment.
Discussion
This qualitative study has investigated the public health
preparedness and response efforts of five EU member
States, with specific reference to MERS-Coronavirus and
polio. Aspects of the work have previously been pub-
lished as ECDC Technical Reports [38] [39], but we are
not aware of any other comparable multi-country re-
search into public health preparedness and response in
Europe. As such, the findings provide important insights
into some of the current preparedness and response pro-
cesses in the region.
The overall finding from this work is that there is a
high level of technical expertise available to implement
existing preparedness and response plans for MERS and
polio, in the event that this became necessary. The fact
that the formal protocols were not always up to date was
to some extent offset by what appeared to be good per-
sonal relations within the relevant professional networks,
which could be brought into play in the event of a public
health emergency. It was also clear to us that the indi-
viduals and institutions concerned well understood the
relevant legal frameworks as well as the operational pro-
cedures that would have to be followed if there was a
MERS outbreak or a polio event in their country.
The most significant preparedness challenges that we
identified were the result of pressures on public budgets
and associated restructuring and reorganization of public
health systems, which brought about consequences ran-
ging from limiting the opportunities for training and ex-
ercises; making it more difficult to recruit and retain
experienced, well trained staff; and for systematically
identifying good practices and lessons learned that could
be incorporated into protocols. Although our study
design did not permit significant investigations into
local-level variations in preparedness [40], budgetary
challenges have been reported before in other contexts
at both national and local levels [41] [42] [43], so it is
likely that this challenge is also reflected at local level in
at least some of the participating countries. An overrid-
ing conclusion, therefore, is that countries must ensure
that sustainable human resource and funding capacity
for public health preparedness and response activities is
secured at all administrative levels, based on systematic
risk assessment and risk ranking exercises.
By conducting this research on two different diseases,
we have observed areas in preparedness and response
where all-hazard, generic plans may be suitable [44] [45],
and other areas where more disease-specific plans are
needed. For example, in relation to cross-border collabor-
ation, it was seen as more important to have protocols
that ensure open communications between the authorities
on both sides of the border than to have a disease-specific
plan. By contrast, the content of risk communication mes-
sages clearly needs to be disease-specific in order to in-
form the public how best to respond to a given threat.
The discussion below outlines some of the issues, both
generic and disease-specific, that have emerged through
this study.
With regard to cross-border communications, the
International Health Regulations (IHR) and Early Warn-
ing and Response System (EWRS) were cited as essential
tools for staying abreast of events in other countries,
and ECDC also manages and facilitates disease-specific
communication platforms that have proven useful for a
variety of disease groups, such as food-and waterborne
disease and vaccine-preventable disease. Such a platform
does not, however, exist for respiratory diseases. Con-
ducting cross-border simulation exercises during ‘peace-
time’ was therefore seen as one way of developing the
requisite networks and contacts to ensure good levels of
preparedness and response for such diseases [46]. Since
exercises can be costly, a legal framework is found in
Article 4 of EU Decision 1082 that could be used to le-
verage funds to support them.
As with cross-border communications, the development
of good inter-sectoral coordination and collaboration
should also be prioritised in public health preparedness
activities [41]. We saw efforts towards this in all the five
countries we visited, though it occurred to different de-
grees in each of the five countries and between the differ-
ent sectors therein: formal procedures or protocols aimed
at ensuring good inter-sectoral collaboration [47] are not
always in place. Where such protocols do not exist, they
should be drafted collectively by the relevant authorities
and circulated to those who will implement them; and
where they do exist, they should be regularly reviewed and
updated as appropriate. An additional strategy that has
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reportedly improved inter-sectoral coordination in pre-
paredness initiatives is the ‘meta-leadership summit’,
which provides a venue for leaders of different organiza-
tions and sectors involved in decision making during a
major emergency to learn the concepts and practice of
multi-sectoral collaboration and resource-sharing [48].
Overall, high technical capacity and preparedness
levels were observed for polio. The absence of environ-
mental surveillance in both Cyprus and Poland, report-
edly due to financial or policy constraints, remained a
concern for some of our interviewees. They pointed out
that relatively modest costs may be incurred by an envir-
onmental surveillance programme over the
short-to-medium term, but such a programme could
nonetheless be seen as a potentially cost-saving exercise
over the longer term, since it could identify a poliomyel-
itis outbreak early on, thus triggering a rapid response
[32] which would significantly reduce its spread, impact,
and cost.
One systemic weakness identified in our study was
that, in several of the countries visited, relatively little of
the risk communication work conducted during previous
public health events has been subjected to formal evalu-
ation – a problem that has previously been reported in
other areas in public health [49]. Consequently, there is
limited documentation about the lessons that have been
learned, which means that effective risk communication
during future public health threats may have to rely on
the relevant institutions having retained those individ-
uals who have previously been engaged in key positions.
This cannot be taken for granted, especially in countries
where austerity measures have significantly cut public
health budgets, and consequently there is the risk of
mistakes from the past being repeated, while good prac-
tices are forgotten [50]. One way to address this gap
would be for Member States to receive training and sup-
port from agencies such as ECDC to develop their evalu-
ation capacity. This could be beneficial both for risk
communication specifically, but also more broadly in re-
lation to other aspects of public health emergency
response.
Study strengths and weaknesses
Some reflections on our methodological approach are
due here. Perhaps the major advantage of our overall
strategy – the use of foreign, or otherwise external social
scientists to conduct open-ended interviews with
in-country experts – was that it provided the opportun-
ity for the latter to reflect on their work in a way that
can offer a fresh perspective on what may often seem
self-evident to them as ‘insiders’ [51].
Further, the multi-sectoral perspective that we took
provided us with a much wider lens through which to
view the different countries’ preparedness activities and
capacities than would have been gained had we focused
only on the health sector. From the participating coun-
tries’ points of view, our meetings with stakeholders
from non-health-related sectors brought people out of
their sectoral ‘silos’, and, in this sense, the research
process itself contributed to awareness raising about
public health preparedness, and to facilitating contacts
between the different stakeholders and sectors.
In spite of these clear advantages, there were also
practical challenges inherent in our methodology, not
least of which were the time and effort required by the
national counterparts to organise the interviews and the
schedules for our visits. Language issues also presented
challenges: all the interviews in Spain were conducted
by native Spanish speakers, but not all interviewees in
Poland, Cyprus or Greece were comfortable or able to
communicate effectively in English, which meant that on
a few occasions we had to bring in professional transla-
tors. This had cost implications, and, although the trans-
lators were invariably excellent, some nuances may have
been lost. In addition, the research team was not able to
understand all the documentation sent to us by the
ECDC NFPs in these countries, which meant we had to
use translation software. Again, although this facilitated
our understanding the main points, some of the finer
details may have been lost.
Finally, this was an exploratory study that covered a
broad range of topics, based on a limited number of key
informants per country. A number of areas were identi-
fied that would benefit from more detailed investigation
in future. For example, we did not review the participat-
ing countries’ health systems structures or organisations
in relation to their preparedness and response capacity,
even if these are clearly important for ensuring good
overall coordination at regional and national level. In
addition, we did not manage to gather rich material on
business continuity, risk assessment, or on the interoper-
ability of plans between different sectors in the event of
a public health emergency. We believe that our overall
methodological approach could be used as the basis for
designing a more comprehensive study, including on
these specific topics, aimed at further improving our un-
derstanding of preparedness planning and implementa-
tion processes.
Conclusions
This qualitative study has investigated preparedness and
response measures to MERS and poliomyelitis in five
different EU Member States. Plans and capacities do
exist in all the countries, and important lessons have
been learned and institutionalised based on experiences
from recent public health emergencies, such as SARS
(2003), the H1N1 pandemic (2009), and Ebola (2014–
2016). There have also been substantial legacy benefits
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from recent mass gatherings such as the Olympics,
which were held in Greece in 2004, and the UK in 2012.
However, the innovations, experience, and training from
these events are vulnerable to political and policy prioritisa-
tion moving away from ensuring sustainable core public
health capacities in some of the participating countries. Fur-
ther, formal evaluations of major public health events are
not systematically conducted in all the countries, whereby
lessons learned may be documented for use in future emer-
gencies. Since much of the strength in the systems that we
have observed is based on good personal connections be-
tween key professionals who work together, these systems
are vulnerable to the possibility that key individuals are in-
capacitated or otherwise unavailable during an emergency.
This applies in particular in relation to inter-sectoral and
cross-border coordination, which, within the context of EU
Decision 1082, are core components of public health pre-
paredness in Europe today. Conducting evaluations, docu-
menting the findings, and disseminating these widely
through regular training of all relevant personnel are there-
fore essential activities for ensuring the resilience of Euro-
pean public health preparedness systems.
Endnotes
1Each EU Member State nominates their own ECDC
NFP for Preparedness and Response. In some cases, ECDC
NFPs are the same individuals as those nominated to be
WHO International Health Regulation focal points, but the
choice depends on the country and there is no specific re-
quirement from the international institutions in this regard.
Depending on the organisational structure of the countries,
ECDC NFPs for Preparedness and Response could sit in
the Ministry of Health or in the National Public Health In-
stitute. The ECDC NFP for Preparedness and Response is
responsible for the following: Facilitating links within the
health sector and with other sectors for the operational as-
pects of preparedness and response plans; Ensuring dissem-
ination of information to, and consolidating input from
relevant sectors of the administration, including those re-
sponsible for other functions related to preparedness and
response (surveillance, laboratories, clinics, public health
services); Ensuring quick and easy contacts with ECDC for
urgent matters; and reviewing Risk Assessments and other
documents together with ECDC before they are made
public.
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